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Synopsis 
Does the energy requirements for the human brain give energy constraints that give reason to 
doubt the feasibility of artificial intelligence? This report will review some relevant estimates of 
brain bioenergetics and analyze some of the methods of estimating brain emulation energy re-
quirements. Turning to AI, there are reasons to believe the energy requirements for de novo AI 
to have little correlation with brain (emulation) energy requirements since cost could depend 
merely of the cost of processing higher-level representations rather than billions of neural fir-
ings. Unless one thinks the human way of thinking is the most optimal or most easily imple-
mentable way of achieving software intelligence, we should expect de novo AI to make use of 
different, potentially very compressed and fast, processes. 
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Recently there has been both major enthusiasm for artificial intelligence (AI) and concerns that 
it might pose major risks to humanity (Bostrom 2014). While a number of high-profile re-
searchers think AI safety should be a high priority (Future of Life Institute 2015), there is also 
significant disagreement about how much risk AI poses. This is especially true for questions 
about human-level and beyond AI. 
Lawrence Krauss (Krauss 2015) is not worried about AI risk; while much of his complacency is 
based on a particular view of the trustworthiness and level of common sense exhibited by pos-
sible future AI that is pretty impossible to criticise, he makes a particular claim: 
First, let’s make one thing clear. Even with the exponential growth in computer storage and 
processing power over the past 40 years, thinking computers will require a digital architecture 
that bears little resemblance to current computers, nor are they likely to become competitive with 
consciousness in the near term. A simple physics thought experiment supports this claim: 
Given current power consumption by electronic computers, a computer with the storage and 
processing capability of the human mind would require in excess of 10 Terawatts of power, 
within a factor of two of the current power consumption of all of humanity. However, the human 
brain uses about 10 watts of power. This means a mismatch of a factor of 1012, or a million 
million. Over the past decade the doubling time for Megaflops/watt has been about 3 years. Even 
assuming Moore’s Law continues unabated, this means it will take about 40 doubling times, or 
about 120 years, to reach a comparable power dissipation. Moreover, each doubling in efficiency 
requires a relatively radical change in technology, and it is extremely unlikely that 40 such dou-
blings could be achieved without essentially changing the way computers compute. 
This claim has several problems. First, few, if any, AI developers think that we must stay with 
current architectures. Second, more importantly, the community concerned with superintelli-
gence risk is generally agnostic about how soon smart AI could be developed: it does not have 
to happen soon for us to have a tough problem in need of a solution, given how hard the AI 
value alignment problem seems to be. Third, consciousness is likely irrelevant for instrumental 
intelligence; maybe the word is just used as a stand-in for some equally messy term like “mind”, 
“common sense” or “human intelligence”. 
The interesting issue is however, what energy requirements and computational power tells us 
about human and machine intelligence, and vice versa. If energy is a major constraint on cog-
nition then we have a way of constraining predictions and claims about future artificial minds. 
Computer and brain emulation energy use 
I have earlier looked at the energy requirements of the Singularity (Sandberg 2015). To sum up, 
current computers are energy hogs requiring 2.5 TW of power globally, with an average cost 
around 25 nJ per operation. More efficient processors are certainly possible (many of the ones 
in current use are old and suboptimal). For example, current GPUs consume about a hundred 
Watts and have 1010 transistors, reaching performance in the 100 Gflops range, one nJ per flop 
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or better1. Koomey’s law states that the energy cost per operation halves every 1.57 years (not 3 
years as Krauss says (Koomey et al. 2011)). So far, the growth of computing capacity has grown 
at about the same pace as energy efficiency, making the two trends cancel each other. In the 
end, Landauer’s principle gives a lower bound of  ln 2 J per irreversible operation (R. Landauer 
1961); one can circumvent this by using reversible or quantum computation, but there are costs 
to error correction — unless we use extremely slow and cold systems in the current era com-
putation will be energy-intensive. 
I am not sure what brain model Krauss bases his estimate on, but 10 TW/25 nJ = 4·1020 opera-
tions per second (using slightly more efficient GPUs ups it to 1022 flops). Looking at the esti-
mates of brain computational capacity in appendix A of my old roadmap (Sandberg and 
Bostrom 2008), this is higher than most. The only estimate that seem to be in the same ballpark 
is (Thagard 2002), which argues that the number of computational elements in the brain are 
far greater than the number of neurons (possibly even individual protein molecules). This is a 
strong claim, to say the least. Especially since current GPUs can do a somewhat credible job of 
end-to-end speech recognition and transcription (Catanzaro 2015): while that corresponds to a 
small part of a brain, it is hardly 10-11 of a brain. 
Generally, assuming a certain number of operations per second in a brain and then calculating 
an energy cost will give you any answer you want. There are people who argue that what really 
matters is the tiny conscious bandwidth (maybe 40 bits/s or less) and that over a lifetime we 
may only learn a gigabit (T. K. Landauer 1986). I used 1022 to 1025 flops just to be on the safe side 
in one post (Sandberg 2009). AIimpacts.org has collected several estimates, getting the median 
estimate 1018 (Grace 2015b). They have also argued in favor of using TEPS (traversed edges per 
second) rather than flops, suggesting around 1014 TEPS for a human brain — a level that is soon 
within reach of some systems (Grace 2015a). 
There are many apples-to-oranges comparisions here. A single processor operation may or 
may not correspond to a floating-point operation, let alone to what a GPU does or a TEPS. 
However, since we are in the land of order-of-magnitude estimates this may not matter too 
much. 
Brain energy use 
We can turn things around: what does the energy use of human brains tell us about their com-
putational capacity? 
Ralph Merkle calculated back in 1989 that given 10 Watts of usable energy per human brain, 
and that the cost of each jump past a node of Ranvier costs 5·10-15 J, producing 2·1015 such op-
erations. He estimated this was about equal to the number of synaptic operations, ending up 
with 1013–1016 operations per second (Merkle 1989). 
A calculation due to Karlheinz Meier argued the brain uses 20 W power, has 100 billion neurons 
firing per second, uses 10-10 J per action potential, plus it has 1015 synapses receiving signals at 
                                                   
1 The Nvidia Titan X reaches 6.2 Tflops using 250 W, 0.04 nJ per flop. 
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about 1 Hz, and uses 10-14 J per synaptic transmission. One can also do it from the bottom to the 
top: there are 109 ATP molecules per action potential, 105 are needed for synaptic transmission. 
10-19 J per ATP gives 10-10 J per action potential and 10-14 J per synaptic transmission. Both these 
estimates converge on the same rough numbers, used by Meier to argue that we need much 
better hardware scaling if we ever want to get to this level of detail. 
Digging deeper into neural energetics, maintaining resting potentials in neurons and glia ac-
count for 28% and 10% of the total brain metabolic cost, respectively, while the actual spiking 
activity is about 13% and transmitter release/recycling plus calcium movement contributes 
about 1% (Lennie 2003). Note how this is not too far from the equipartition in Meier’s estimate. 
Looking at total brain metabolism this constrains the neural firing rate: more than 3.1 spikes 
per second per neuron would consume more energy than the brain normally consumes (and 
this is likely an optimistic estimate). The brain simply cannot afford firing more than 1% of 
neurons at the same time, so it likely relies on rather sparse representations. 
Unmyelinated axons require about 5 nJ/cm to transmit action potentials (Crotty, Sangrey, and 
Levy 2006). In general, the brain gets around it through some current optimization (Alle, Roth, 
and Geiger 2009), myelinisation (which also speeds up transmission at the price of increased 
error rate), and likely many clever coding strategies. Biology is clearly strongly energy con-
strained. In addition, cooling a 20 W brain through a bloodflow of 750-1000 ml/min is rela-
tively tight given that the arterial blood is already at body temperature.  
20 W divided by 1.3·10-21 J (the Landauer limit at body temperature) suggests a limit of no more 
than 1.6·1022 irreversible operations per second. While a huge number, it is just a few orders 
higher than many of the estimates we have been juggling so far. If we say these operations are 
distributed across 100 billion neurons (which is at least within an order of magnitude of the real 
number (Azevedo et al. 2009)) we get 160 billion operations per second per neuron; if we in-
stead treat synapses (about 8000 per neuron) as the loci we get 20 million operations per second 
per synapse. 
Running the full Hodgkin-Huxley neural model at 1 ms resolution requires about 1200 flops, 
or 1.2 million flops per second of simulation per compartment (Izhikevich 2004). If we treat a 
synapse as a compartment, that is just 16.6 times the Landauer limit: if the neural simulation 
had multiple digit precision and erased a few of them per operation we would bump into the 
Landauer limit straight away. Synapses are actually fairly computationally efficient! At least at 
body temperature: cryogenically cooled computers could of course do much better. And as 
Izikievich, the originator of the 1200 flops estimate, likes to point out, his model requires just 
13 flops (Izhikevich 2004): maybe we do not need to model the ion currents like Hodgkin-Hux-
ley to get the right behavior, and can hence shave off two orders of magnitude. 
Information dissipation in neural networks 
Just how much information is lost in neural processing? 
A brain is an autonomous dynamical system changing internal state in a complicated way (let 
us ignore sensory inputs for the current discussion). If we start in a state somewhere within 
Energetics of The Brain and AI 
— 6 — 
some predefined volume of state-space, over time the state will move to other states and the 
initial uncertainty will grow. Eventually the possible volume we can find the state in will have 
doubled, and we will have lost one bit of information. 
Things are a bit more complicated, since the dynamics can contract along some dimensions 
and diverge along others: this is described by the Lyapunov exponents. If the trajectory has 
exponent  in some direction nearby trajectories diverge like | − | ∝ |0 − 0|	 in 
that direction. In a dissipative dynamical system, the sum of the exponents is negative: in total, 
trajectories move towards some attractor set. However, if at least one of the exponents is posi-
tive, then this can be a strange attractor that the trajectories endlessly approach, yet they locally 
diverge from each other and gradually mix. So if you can only measure with a fixed precision 
at some point in time, you can not tell with certainly where the trajectory was before (because 
of the contraction due to negative exponents has thrown away starting location information), 
nor exactly where it will be on the attractor in the future (because the positive exponents are 
amplifying your current uncertainty). 
A measure of the information loss is the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy (Sinai 2009), which is 
bounded by 
 ≤ ∑  , the sum of the positive Lyapunov exponents. Therefore, if we calculate 
the KS-entropy of a neural system, we can estimate how much information is being thrown 
away per unit of time (and hence get a hint of energy dissipation). 
Monteforte and Wolf looked at one simple neural model, the theta-neuron (Monteforte and 
Wolf 2010). They found a KS-entropy of roughly 1 bit per neuron and spike over a large range 
of parameters. Given the above estimates of about one spike per second per neuron, this gives 
us an overall information loss of 1011 bits/s in the brain, which is 1.3·10-10 W at the Landauer 
limit — by this account, we are some 11 orders of magnitude away from thermodynamic per-
fection. In this picture, we should regard each action potential corresponding to roughly one 
irreversible yes/no decision: perhaps a not too unreasonable claim. 
It is worth noticing that one can look at cognition as a system with a large-scale dynamics that 
has one entropy (corresponding to shifting between different high-level mental states) and mi-
croscale dynamics with different entropy (corresponding to the neural information pro-
cessing). It is a safe bet that the biggest entropy costs are on the microscale (fast, numerous 
simple states) than the macroscale (slow, few but complex states). If a computing system has a 
dynamics mimicking the brain on the microscale, we should expect it to dissipate more than 
10-10 W. This is a very weak bound.  
Energy of AI 
Where does this leave us in regards to the energy requirements of artificial intelligence? 
Assuming the same amount of energy is needed for a human and machine to do a cognitive 
task is a mistake. 
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First, as the Izikievich neuron demonstrates (Izhikevich 2004), it might be that judicious ab-
straction easily saves two orders of magnitude of computation/energy. Special purpose hard-
ware can also save one or two orders of magnitude (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012; 
Lu et al. 2015; Park et al. 2015). Using general-purpose processors for fixed computations is very 
inefficient (this is why GPUs are at present so useful for neural processing: in many cases, we 
just want to perform the same action on many pieces of data rather than different actions on 
the same piece). Further careful design may reduce the demands even more (Cao, Chen, and 
Khosla 2014; Panda, Sengupta, and Roy 2015). 
More importantly, on what level the task is implemented matters. Sorting or summing a list of 
a thousand elements is a fast computer operation that can be done in memory in microseconds, 
but is an hour-long task for a human. Because of our mental architecture we need to represent 
the information in a far more redundant and slow way, not to mention perform individual 
actions on the seconds time-scale. A computer sort uses a tight representation more like our 
low-level neural circuitry. I have no doubt one could string together biological neurons to per-
form a sort or sum operation quickly (c.f. (Ditto 2003)), but cognition happens on a higher, 
more general level of the system (intriguing speculations about idiot savants aside). 
While we have reason to admire brains, they are also unable to perform certain very useful 
computations. In artificial neural networks we often employ non-local matrix operations like 
inversion to calculate optimal weights (Toutounian and Ataei 2009): these computations are 
not possible to perform locally in a distributed manner. Gradient descent algorithms such as 
backpropagation are unrealistic in a biological sense, but clearly very successful in deep learn-
ing. There is no shortage of papers describing various clever approximations that would allow 
a more biologically realistic system to perform similar operations — in fact, the brains may well 
be doing it — but artificial systems can perform them directly, and by using low-level hardware 
intended for it, very efficiently. 
When a deep learning system learns object recognition in a week2 it beats a human baby by 
many months. When it learns to do analogies from 1.6 billion text snippets in 85 minutes (Pen-
nington, Socher, and Manning 2014) it beats human children by years. These are small domains, 
yet they are domains that are very important to humans and presumably develop as quickly 
and efficiently as possible in children. 
Biology has many advantages in robustness and versatility, not to mention energy efficiency. 
Nevertheless, it is also fundamentally limited by what can be built out of cells with a particular 
kind of metabolism, the fact that organisms need to build themselves from the inside, and the 
need of solving problems that exist in a particular biospheric environment. 
                                                   
2 The time to train a deep neural network on the ImageNet database on individual computers with GPU support is on 
the order of days (Liu 2016). 
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Conclusion 
Unless one thinks the human way of thinking is the most optimal or most easily implementable 
way, we should expect de novo AI to make use of different, potentially very compressed and 
fast, processes3. Hence, the costs of brain computation is merely a proof of existence that there 
are systems that effective. The same mental tasks could well be done by far less or far more 
efficient systems. 
In the end, we may try to estimate fundamental energy costs of cognition to bound AI energy 
use. If human-like cognition takes a certain number of bit erasures per second, we would get 
some bound using Landauer (ignoring reversible computing). However, as the above discussion 
has showed, it may be that the actual computational cost needed is just some of the higher-level 
representations rather than billions of neural firings: until we actually understand intelligence, 
we cannot say. By that point the question is moot anyway. 
Many people have the intuition that the cautious approach is to always state “things won’t 
work”. However, this mixes up cautious with conservative (or even reactionary). A better cau-
tious approach is to recognize that “things may work”, and then start checking the possible con-
sequences. If we want a reassuring constraint on why certain things cannot happen it need to 
be tighter than energy estimates. 
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